

4 March 1973

Second Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF
THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS*

(This report covers the week from 25 February
through 3 March 1973)

The Key Points

- North Vietnamese troops, military equipment and supplies continued to move southward toward and into South Vietnam during the week, in a clear violation of the Vietnam settlement agreement.
- Although the agreement has now been in effect for over a month, there is good evidence that the southward flow of equipment and supplies has increased to levels above those of one year ago.

- The number of combat incidents initiated by the Communists in violation of the ceasefire terms has declined slightly in South Vietnam, and markedly in Laos, during the week.

NSA & DIA
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Instructions on File.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

The Details

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(NOTE: This is the second in a series of weekly reports detailing recent Communist actions which we believe to be violations of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements. [redacted]

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A. Continuing Infiltration and Redeployment of North Vietnamese Personnel in Violation of the Agreement

1. During the past week we continued to receive incontrovertible evidence that Hanoi is still infiltrating personnel toward South Vietnam in violation of the settlement agreement. The latest evidence indicates that several hundred additional military and civilian specialists began moving south from North Vietnam last week, and that other groups of infiltrators continued to move southward in the Laos panhandle during the week. All together, there are now about 30,000 North Vietnamese infiltrators moving through the pipeline. Of these, at least 6,000 personnel, including both regular combat troops and civilian and military specialists, probably have left their starting point in North Vietnam since 28 January. While the combat personnel included in this number appear to have begun their trip in the first ten days or so after the ceasefire, some of the specialists did not start their trip southward until 26 February. [redacted]

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2. During the past week, no major integral Communist units (i.e., as distinct from infiltration groups containing replacement fillers for existing units) were detected moving into or out of South Vietnam. One minor unit, however -- an NVA armored battalion -- was observed on 28 February on the border between southern GVN MR 1 and Laos. We do not know precisely when the unit first arrived at the border, but it probably arrived recently. The battalion is almost certainly part of the large amount of armor previously noted

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Most Communist main-force units now within South Vietnam are resting and refitting in what is basically a standdown posture, and are engaged in establishing more permanent base areas.

B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies by the North Vietnamese in Violation of the Agreement

3. The information contained in the following paragraphs covers the movement of military equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam and into Laos and South Vietnam during the past week. Taken as a whole, our evidence indicates that large amounts of supplies continued to move, especially throughout southern Laos. Within South Vietnam, pervasive reports of vehicles on the move -- many of them transporting weapons and ammunition -- clearly indicate that Communist supply activities are also continuing there at substantial levels.

4. The following indications of Communist logistic activity have been observed on roads within South Vietnam in the areas of the Laos border since 24 February and probably reflect supplies which have entered South Vietnam during that time.

(a) On Route 608 north of Khe Sanh, there were 32 North Vietnamese cargo trucks observed

There were 20 cargo trucks and 6 unidentified vehicles seen on this route

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(b) Thirty North Vietnamese cargo vehicles were seen moving on Route Q9D west of Khe Sanh

There were 7 trucks observed on this route on

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(c) During the period [] there was an average of 4 trucks per day observed moving eastward probably carrying supplies on Routes 9 and 548 in northern Quang Tri Province.

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(d) Two reliable reports received on [] indicate that as of mid-February, military supplies were continuing to enter Thua

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Thien Province from Laos, and that base areas where the supplies were to be stored were being established in the mountains about 25 miles southwest of Hue.

(e) Recent evidence indicates that the North Vietnamese may now be deploying 130mm artillery field guns into GVN MR 3.

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twelve 130mm field guns being towed from Snoul, Cambodia, to Loc Ninh, South Vietnam.

5. In addition to the above supply activity observed within South Vietnam, [] increasing North Vietnamese logistic movements throughout the Lao panhandle and northeastern Cambodia. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involves supplies destined for South Vietnam.

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(a) During the period [] southbound truck movements through the Ban Karai Pass and Ban Raving Pass between North Vietnam and southern Laos increased significantly.

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[] southbound trucks observed in the Ban Karai Pass averaged 69 per day during this period as compared with 52 per day the previous week, while the average number of southbound trucks moving through the Ban Raving Pass rose to 27 daily during the current reporting period, compared with 17 during the previous week.

(b) During the period []

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[] over 5,160 enemy trucks were observed in southern Laos. Of the total, at least 330 were specifically headed toward South Vietnam -- and primarily for the southern half of South Vietnam.

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(c) During the same period [redacted]

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[redacted] over 60 trucks

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on roads leading into northern South Vietnam from Laos. More than half of these trucks were heading east toward the South Vietnamese border. In addition, [redacted] an 18-truck convoy loaded with supplies moving south along the Lao-South Vietnamese border just west of Quang Tri Province on 24 February.

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(d) [redacted]

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about 50 North Vietnamese vehicles were observed moving cargo on Route 922 in the eastern Lao panhandle.

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(e) [redacted]

a total of 16 North Vietnamese vehicles -- probably cargo trucks -- were observed moving south from the Ban Bac area in southern Laos.

(f) [redacted]

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14 North Vietnamese cargo trucks were seen on Route 912B in Laos immediately west of the Ban Karai Pass.

(g)

A substantial number of vehicles (the exact number is unknown but is less than fifty) were observed returning from northeastern Cambodia to the tri-border area of Laos [redacted] to participate in logistic activity in the latter area.

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(h) [redacted]

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a North Vietnamese logistic unit in the tri-border area of Laos was observed while receiving 15 vehicles loaded with supplies. Thirteen of the vehicles were carrying some kind of machinery.

6. Inside North Vietnam, additional evidence continued to accumulate during the week on the movement of military supplies within North Vietnam toward northern Laos, southern Laos, or South Vietnam.

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(b) [redacted] 18 cargo trucks transporting munitions were observed moving from the Vinh area of North Vietnam westward along Route 7 toward northern Laos. Firm evidence indicates that the destination of these munitions was in fact northern Laos.

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(c) [redacted] another convoy of 10 North Vietnamese trucks was observed moving on Route 7 inside North Vietnam toward northern Laos.

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7. In the immediate DMZ area, there was the following additional evidence of resupply activity in support of North Vietnamese military forces.

(a) [redacted] sustained numbers of trucks were continuing to move southward through the DMZ [redacted] about 30 trucks were observed entering a North Vietnamese truck park located in the western DMZ near the Lao border in a one-hour period. In addition, southbound trucks were observed crossing a pontoon bridge in the eastern DMZ. [redacted]

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[redacted] truck parks observed south of the DMZ in eastern Quang Tri Province contained many more trucks than when the same truck parks had been observed several weeks earlier.

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(b) A convoy of 18 North Vietnamese cargo trucks was seen moving on Route 102B in the western DMZ on [redacted]

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(c) Ten North Vietnamese cargo trucks were observed moving southward on Route 103 in the DMZ area on [redacted]

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C. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in South Vietnam Since the Ceasefire

8. In South Vietnam, the total numbers of Communist initiated ceasefire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 28 January and for last week (25 February through 3 March) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since Ceasefire		Last Week (25 Feb-3 Mar)		
	Level of Action	Major 1/	Minor 1/	Level of Action	Major
MR 1	420	1,683	68	236	
MR 2	105	643	18	92	
MR 3	102	931	26	96	
MR 4	178	1,853	27	291	
Totals	805	5,110	139 (146) 2/	715 (948) 2/	

1/ DOD definitions of major and minor violations are contained in ANNEX III.

2/ Denotes totals of previous week.

9. During the past week, the number of major violations decreased slightly from 146 to 139. The greatest reduction occurred in MR 4 which reported 27 major violations as opposed to 41 the previous week. The number of reported minor violations also decreased from 948 to 715, and the largest decrease (from 327 to 236) took place in MR 1.



10. The following is a chronological listing of the most significant "major" Communist violations of the ceasefire in South Vietnam that were reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces during the past week (25 February - 3 March):

MILITARY REGION 1:

(a) On 24 February, in two separate attacks three miles southwest of Quang Tri City, enemy elements fired a total of thirty-five 82mm mortar rounds in the vicinity of a GVN airborne battalion.



TOTAL MAJOR AND MINOR CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM



X=Cease-fire date - 28 January 1973 (GMT)

(All days thereafter are referred to as X+1, X+2, etc.)

- (b) On 25 February, 14 miles south-southwest of Da Nang on Route 537, enemy sappers destroyed one span of a bridge, closing the road.
- (c) On 26 and 27 February, in the Airborne Division sector southwest of Quang Tri City, enemy units fired a total of 1,030 mixed artillery, mortar and recoilless rifle rounds in 21 attacks-by-fire. One of the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground attack.
- (d) On 28 February and 1 March, in the Airborne Division sector southwest of Quang Tri City, the enemy directed seven attacks-by-fire of 270 mixed mortar and artillery rounds against airborne units. One of the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground attack.
- (e) On 28 February, 12 miles south-southeast of Da Nang, a US UH-1H helicopter displaying ICCS markings and carrying two ICCS passengers (one Canadian and one Indonesian) received ground fire while landing.
- (f) On 1 March southwest of Quang Tri City, elements of two ARVN airborne battalions received five separate attacks-by-fire (ABFs) totaling 158 mixed 60mm/82mm mortar rounds.
- (g) On 2 March, 10 miles northwest of Tam Ky, an element of an RF battalion received an ABF of 50 rounds of 82mm mortar and 30 rounds of B-40 rockets followed by a ground attack.
- (h) On 2 March, 18 miles west of Tam Ky, an element of an ARVN infantry battalion received an ABF of 20 rounds of 82mm mortar and four AT-3 missiles followed by a ground attack.
- (i) On 2 March, southwest of Quang Tri City, elements of three ARVN airborne battalions received four separate attacks-by-fire totaling 115 82mm mortar rounds.
- (j) On 2 March, nine miles west of Hue, enemy forces attacked elements of two infantry battalions on five separate occasions with a total of 472 rounds of mixed 60mm/82mm mortar fire. One of the attacks-by-fire was followed by a ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 2:

- (a) On 25 February, 11 miles south-southwest of Kontum City, enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN ranger battalion.
- (b) On 27 February, 14 miles north-northwest of Kontum City, a US UH-1 helicopter displaying ICCS markings and carrying representatives of all ICCS member nations received ground fire.
- (c) On 27 February, 15 miles north of Qui Nhon, elements of an ARVN infantry battalion received an enemy ground attack.

MILITARY REGION 3:

- (a) On 24 February, seven miles south-southwest of Dau Tieng, enemy gunners shot down a VNAF UH-1 helicopter.
- (b) On 26 February, six miles northeast of Tay Ninh, enemy forces fired 90 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 107mm rockets in the vicinity of an RF battalion.
- (c) On 1 March, two miles southwest of Lai Thieu, enemy forces assassinated the hamlet chief of Dan Bri hamlet.

MILITARY REGION 4:

- (a) On 24 February, 12 miles northeast of Vinh Long, enemy forces attacked elements of an infantry battalion.
- (b) On 26 February, 10 miles north-northwest of Vinh Long, enemy forces fired 70 rounds of 60mm mortar into a Popular Force outpost.
- (c) On 26 February, 10 miles south-southeast of Vi Thanh, enemy forces attacked elements of an infantry battalion.

- (d) On 27 February, 10 miles northeast of Chau Duc, enemy forces attacked elements of an ARVN infantry battalion.
- (e) On 28 February, seven miles south-southeast of Sa Dec, the hamlet chief of Tan Thuan hamlet was assassinated.
- (f) On 1 March, six miles southeast of Tan Phu, the hamlet chief of Tan An hamlet was assassinated.

D. Combat Activity Instigated by Communist Forces in Laos During the Past Week

11. The fighting in Laos has diminished considerably during the past week. Following is a brief account of significant combat incidents which occurred on each day of the past week and which were clearly initiated by Communist forces in violation of the ceasefire agreement on Laos.

- On 26 February, one major incident occurred in MR IV of Laos, where enemy forces attacked a government position near Thateng on the northern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. A 120-man friendly unit was dispersed with eleven men killed and six wounded. Elsewhere, activity was sporadic and light. General quiet prevailed in the previously active Plaine des Jarres and Paksong areas.
- On 27 February, activity continued to decline throughout the country. Two incidents were reported in northwest MR I of Laos, where heavy shelling drove friendly forces from Muong Moung. Elsewhere, enemy units on the Bolovens Plateau followed up the previous day's attacks in the Thateng area.
- On 28 February, the level of fighting further decreased. Enemy forces continued to harass friendly troops to the south of Thateng on the Bolovens. Elsewhere, the only significant enemy-initiated action was a shelling

attack and subsequent ground attack which drove friendly forces from forward positions west of Bouam Long in Lao MR II.

- On 1 March, scattered small incidents which were initiated by the Communists occurred in MR III and MR IV of Laos, but there was no other significant activity.
- On 2 March, only scattered small incidents were reported.
- On 3 March, activity was also at a very low level.

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ANNEX III

Definition of "major" and "minor" ceasefire violations:

Paragraph 8 of this memorandum contains a table listing the total number of Communist-inspired ceasefire violations reported by the GVN, both for the past week and for the whole period since the ceasefire became effective on 28 January. The determination of whether a violation is "major" or "minor" is based on the following criteria, which have been established by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Major Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities or population centers:

- Receive numerous rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, or rocket fire within a short period of time or sporadically over a period of hours.
- Receive a multi-company (150-400 men) ground attack with or without supporting fire.
- Are subjected to one or more acts of terrorism involving extensive use of mines and demolitions.

Minor Violation: One in which US/friendly forces, facilities or population centers:

- Receive one or a very few rounds of enemy mortar, artillery, rocket, or small arms fire following an extended period during which no stand-off attacks-by-fire were received.
- Receive a small ground probe, unsupported by significant mortar, artillery, or rocket fire, following an extended period during which no attacks of this type were received.
- Are subjected to one or a very few small terrorist attacks involving use of mines and demolitions following an extended period during which no attacks of this type were received.